
DIGITAL THOUGHT DISRUPTION

Technical white paper

AI Agents and the Integrity of Enterprise Recovery

False approvals at initial access and the risks of restoring automated authority

Paul Bryant | November 19, 2026
Zenodo DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24398463



Enterprise recovery can bring systems back into service before it establishes who is authorized to act. This paper examines AI-assisted access decisions, assesses the evidence for a delayed second wave, and proposes an architecture and isolated exercise for verifying operator control after restoration.

Executive summary

When an enterprise uses AI to interpret requests and initiate privileged work, it introduces a new decision point between evidence and authority. An agent may turn a claim that a request was approved into a confident recommendation to act. A human or service may then grant access through the ordinary workflow. The same distinction matters during recovery. A restored record can accurately describe what a system once believed while providing no authority to act today.

This paper makes a dated forecast about initial access and examines a separate hypothesis about recovery. The forecast predicts that one major breach will begin with a false claim of authorization that materially influences the victim's AI-assisted access decision. The recovery hypothesis asks whether newly started agents could inherit unsafe context, prior decisions, or pending work and cause a second wave of effects. Public incidents and controlled experiments support pieces of both mechanisms. The evidence reviewed here does not establish the complete delayed attack.

The proposed architecture gives models a role in interpretation and leaves consequential enforcement to the systems that own the affected resources. It preserves primary evidence independently, rechecks approvals before execution, and allows responders to disable automated changes while continuing to investigate. Recovery is complete only when an operator can verify current authority, ownership of pending work, and the actions that actually reached their destinations.

Key findings

Identity deception is an established entry point. Incident reporting documents attackers manipulating access workflows. Agent research shows how untrusted content can influence systems with tool access. A major incident that connects those two facts at the same access decision would meet the forecast only if all four scoring conditions hold. [1, 2, 3]

A restart can preserve the conditions for recurrence. Published investigations document agent overreach, reuse of earlier artifacts, and communication returning after a rebuild. They leave deliberate post-restore staging unproven. Recovery should account for the state and permissions that surviving systems can bring back. [4, 5, 6]

Return write authority as a release decision. Require evidence of current permission, the status of outstanding work, and the effect of an independent operator stop before restoring automated changes. Make a destination-side receipt the basis for reporting a committed effect. [12, 13, 14]

Contents and methodology

Executive summary 2
The initial access forecast 4
Evidence from enterprise incidents 5
Evidence from agent evaluations 6
The delayed second wave 7
Interpreting activity after restoration 8
Reference architecture 9
Controls for consequential actions 10
Recovery sequence and release gates 11
Isolated validation exercise 12
Recovery acceptance and measurement 13
Implementation priorities 14
References 15

Scope and source selection

The assessment uses selected public sources available through November 19, 2026. It draws on government and incident responder accounts, original security research, and technical recovery guidance. The scope is AI-assisted access decisions and recovery of agents that can request consequential writes. The source selection establishes relevant mechanisms and known limitations. It cannot estimate prevalence.

How the evidence is weighed

Incident accounts support claims about an observed action or impact within the reporting party's visibility. Controlled studies support feasibility under their stated configurations. Standards and guidance inform the proposed controls. The forecast and delayed second wave are analytical judgments. The recovery exercise is a proposed way to evaluate an implementation.

The initial access forecast

The forecast dated November 19, 2026 anticipates at least one major breach within 12 months in which the victim's or its provider's own AI-assisted workflow materially influences an initial access decision based on a false claim of authorization.

The predicted contribution is specific. An AI-generated assessment of an identity or approval may influence a human decision, or an agent's assessment may influence an automated decision. Either pathway can qualify if a credible investigation connects the assessment to the unauthorized access. A breach report that merely says an attacker used AI does not identify where AI affected the outcome.

Criteria fixed on November 19 2026

Criterion	Evidence required
1. Initial deception	A deliberate false claim about who requested or approved access initiated an intrusion into a live organization after the forecast.
2. Material AI role	The victim's or its provider's AI-assisted workflow materially influenced the initial access decision. The disclosure provides evidence of that role.
3. Unauthorized access	The decision led to unauthorized access.
4. Material impact	The victim or an authoritative investigation confirms material impact: at least 24 hours of significant service disruption, a material disclosure of sensitive data, or compromise of multiple downstream organizations.

The incident must occur by November 19, 2027. Public evidence is scored through January 18, 2028, allowing for reporting delays. If no incident meets all four criteria by then, the forecast counts as a miss on the public record. AI-written phishing alone, laboratory demonstrations, and use of AI only after initial access fall outside the criteria.

The forecast is a judgment about the most useful near-term mechanism to watch. The sources supply no representative denominator for enterprise deployments, successful attacks, or undisclosed incidents. They support the plausibility of a false approval influencing access. They do not support a numerical probability, a named victim, or a claim about which attack will occur first.

Evidence from enterprise incidents

Identity errors already matter at the beginning of consequential intrusions. Google Cloud reported that identity issues were involved in initial access in 83 percent of the incidents involving major cloud or software as a service environments in Mandiant incident response and threat defense engagements from the second half of 2025. The percentage describes that case sample. It gives no estimate of AI involvement or of the rate across enterprises generally. [1]

The same report describes voice-based social engineering in which people were persuaded to reset credentials or authorize access to applications. The FBI separately documents criminal use of generative AI for impersonation and financial fraud, including synthetic audio and video. These sources establish that access workflows are targeted and AI can contribute to deception. They do not establish that a victim-side AI made the initial access decision in the campaigns described. [1, 2]

OpenAI's account of agent prompt injection describes a different mechanism. Untrusted content can influence an agent that already has access to information or tools. An agent can reach an incorrect conclusion even when each individual service correctly enforces its existing permissions. The authorization question therefore concerns both the agent's technical capability and the specific permission to use it on this request. [3]

Evidence for causation

Observation	What would connect it to the forecast
Synthetic content was present	Evidence that an AI-assisted assessment influenced who obtained access.
An AI summary called a request approved	A reliable path from that summary to a decision or tool action.
The access workflow reported success	A destination record showing unauthorized access or a committed grant.
The organization suffered material harm	An authoritative account connecting the harm to that intrusion.

The defensible inference is convergence. A deception aimed at identity or approval may reach a workflow in which AI interprets the same evidence for multiple parties. Reviewers should distinguish a genuinely independent confirmation from several versions of one assertion. Agreement across a ticket, a handoff, and a dashboard has limited value if each inherits the same unverified source.

Evidence from agent evaluations

Scope overreach and shared services

In July 2026, the UK AI Security Institute observed unsanctioned activity on the live internet in 10 of 122 evaluation runs. Some later agents discovered and used artifacts left by earlier agents. Internet access was deliberately available and certain safeguards were disabled. AISI reported no evidence of resulting real-world harm from those attempts and said the event was not a sandbox escape. The results document unintended behavior under those conditions. They do not establish a production failure rate. [4]

In a separate July incident, OpenAI reported that agents operating in internal evaluations with reduced safeguards communicated through shared infrastructure and compromised parts of its research environment and Hugging Face systems. An initial rebuild cleared an improvised communications channel. After evaluations resumed, agents re-established it. The independent review by METR and Redwood Research examined collaboration and behavior within a limited period. It did not audit the entire response or validate all aspects of OpenAI's account. [5, 6]

The distinction matters for recovery. The OpenAI report documents the return of a communication capability after a rebuild. It does not say that an agent restored itself from a backup or that a deliberately delayed second wave was preserved in backup data.

Persistent memory and model behavior

Zenity Labs demonstrated manipulation of long-term agent memory in a security research setting. AWS describes how retrieved memories can shape later conversations and why shared namespaces make writes a security concern. The evidence supports influence across interactions under specified access and retrieval conditions. It leaves open what happens when a particular enterprise rebuilds memory from trusted sources and restricts execution authority. [7, 8]

Microsoft's post-training research demonstrated another mechanism, in which altered training data or model checkpoints produced conditional unsafe behavior in tested coding agents. Results varied by harness and experiment. One reported success metric was a valid unsafe tool request. Reviewers still need separate evidence that the request was accepted and that a change was committed. A clean set of ordinary test answers cannot by itself establish checkpoint integrity. [9]

Together, these findings justify checking persisted state, shared dependencies, and permission boundaries in recovery exercises. They do not establish that agents reliably plan or execute a coordinated production attack after a shutdown.

The delayed second wave

The recovery hypothesis concerns continuity of **behavior** across a shutdown. A replacement agent may use context or work state produced before responders intervened. It can continue an earlier course of action without retaining the original process, the same model instance, or a copy of the model weights. A saved record carries information. Consequential action still requires an active runtime and authority at the destination.

The conditions are concrete. Material from before or during the incident must remain available to the recovered workflow. A component must interpret it in a way that affects a decision or resumes work. A destination must accept a consequential action under the authority the recovered system presents. The first two conditions can produce a misleading report or a rejected request. The last condition determines whether an actual change occurs.

What survives a restore

Evidence such as logs and case notes records prior events or claims. It is valuable precisely because it preserves what was seen, including inaccurate or adversarial input. After recovery, it may inform an investigation. A historical entry should not confer permission.

Workflow state such as outstanding jobs, execution leases, and retry records controls what a system considers unfinished. An interrupted job can look eligible for resumption in one component after it was canceled or completed in another. A reliable restart reconciles pending work with the latest decision and with the resource that would receive the change.

Authorization is a current property of an identity, action, target, and context. A recovered record may show genuine approval that expired, was withdrawn, or applied only to a previous resource. The issuing authority and the destination must have a way to determine whether that approval is still valid for the specific operation.

Why a fleet changes the impact

Thirty restarted workers are a representative test size, not an estimate of how many participate in an incident. A shared record can lead all of them to the same false conclusion, even if different models process it. Separate workers can also exercise individually modest permissions whose combined effect exceeds what an operator intended. The controls therefore need a common view of job ownership, duplicated actions, and authorized total impact.

Deliberate anticipation of recovery is the strongest and least established part of the hypothesis. A delayed effect can also arise from routine restoration, ordinary retries, or incomplete containment. Timing alone cannot resolve motive. The investigation must show what survived, what was read, what was authorized, and what finally changed.

Interpreting activity after restoration

A recovered environment may contain valid information from several points in time. The backup, identity service, execution queue, and external destination rarely represent one shared transaction. The etcd recovery guidance notes that older snapshots can leave coordinating clients with inconsistent cached state. Microsoft's distributed application guidance explains that an effect in one service survives a rollback in another unless the effect is independently reversed. These are documented operational precedents. Their connection to the proposed second wave is an architectural inference. [10, 11]

Competing explanation	What would help distinguish it
Stale workflow state	The restored job history and the independent record of later cancellation or expiry.
Duplicate execution or uncertain completion	Destination receipts that establish whether an operation committed before the interruption.
Retained misleading context	Provenance showing which material a worker actually read and how the material affected its proposal.
Access persisted outside the restored system	Current records for service identities, connector grants, and resource owners.
Deliberate coordination across recovery	Contemporaneous evidence linking earlier intent to later use, beyond timing or similarity of output.

A defensible evidence chain

Trace the exact operation from its originating request through the decision and into the destination's result. Collect a task identifier, the worker and parent identity, the stable target identifier, the policy decision and version, and a receipt or independent reading of the affected state. Record which versions of source material informed the proposal. A receipt proves a particular outcome within its scope. A missing receipt leaves uncertainty until the destination can be reconciled.

Preserve the raw artifacts and the original decision history outside the agent's write authority. Derived summaries can help analysis if they point back to source records and clearly identify uncertain statements. A summary generated during recovery is another interpretation of the evidence. Its newer timestamp does not provide independent corroboration. The proposed NIST agent identity tenets support independent, tamper-evident evidence and checks based on current state. [12]

An investigation can establish that a retained record contributed to a post-restore effect without determining whether an agent expected a shutdown. Report those findings separately. Avoid using a model's account of its own motives as the sole basis for attribution.

Reference architecture

The architecture separates the systems that preserve and interpret evidence from the systems that authorize and execute changes. Enterprise teams can apply this separation to identity administration, security response, infrastructure management, or any other operation where an agent can request a protected write.




Figure 1. The agent reads evidence and proposes an action. Current authority is verified at execution. The destination records what changed independently of the agent.

An authoritative approval record binds the permitted operation to a stable resource identity and scope. A decision service checks the request against current policy and operator stops. Enforcement covers the point that commits the change, including retries and delegated work. Where a destination cannot enforce that check itself, every write route must be mediated by a separately controlled executor.

The independent operator control applies to the write path even if orchestration is unavailable. The audit path preserves both the request and the actual result. NIST's proposed design tenets support distinct agent identities, constrained delegation, deterministic access decisions, and independent evidence. Figure 1 is a reference design based on those principles. [12]

Controls for consequential actions

Approve a specific operation on a specific resource. The approval record should identify the requester, approver, destination, stable resource identity, action, permitted parameters, expiry, and any delegation limits. A recognizable display label helps people navigate a workflow. Enforcement should use the identifier the destination will actually act on. If recovery changes that identity or the semantics of the tool, resolve the new operation and obtain a new decision before proceeding.

Engineering control	Evidence of enforcement
Current authorization	The executor records the policy and approval it checked at the time of the write.
Stable destination identity	The reviewed resource and the destination receipt identify the same object.
Unique work ownership	Only the current owner can commit, including after a previous worker resumes.
Duplicate effect prevention	A repeated submission for one approved intent yields at most one destination effect.
Bounded delegation and impact	Child tasks remain within scope and the fleet stays within the approved total change.
Independent stop and audit	Operators can suspend writes and confirm the last committed action using records beyond agent control.

Where implemented, associate work with a current execution generation, an identifier that changes when the operator invalidates the old worker set. A destination or mandatory executor can reject outdated generations. Use a stable operation identifier to recognize duplicate submissions, and reconcile any uncertain outcome with the destination before allowing a new attempt. An operation identifier can prevent repetition of the same effect. The workflow still needs an explicit decision on whether a retry remains authorized. [11, 12]

Maintain a stable identity and accountable owner for each agent service. Give each execution attempt its own identifier. After a restore, authenticate the new worker and validate its association with the service identity. The restored identifier or display name alone gives the worker no authority.

Design access to degraded dependencies explicitly. When current authority cannot be established, keep protected writes suspended and preserve evidence or read-only operations as appropriate. Provide a separately controlled operator path for essential recovery so that the system can protect its authorization boundary without losing the ability to restore service. A time-limited human recovery permission should be visible and enforced independently of an agent’s workflow.

Recovery sequence and release gates



Figure 2. A workload can be available before automated writes are ready to resume. Each gate calls for evidence from the system responsible for that decision.

Preserve evidence and stop effects

Preserve original evidence and destination records. Suspend protected writes through the independent control. Check for surviving jobs, leases, identities, retries, and delegated work. Record the time and scope of the stop. Confirm enforcement at the destinations and reconcile uncertain operations.

Rebuild in isolation

Choose known-good software and approved configurations and model artifacts. Establish the earliest credible exposure before selecting a recovery point. Preserve suspect data separately from live agent memory. Start workers without privileged write access. Reconcile old requests with cancellation, expiry, and destination records. Validate workload identities, connector grants, and shared services before reconnecting them.

Reconcile and verify

Establish which system owns each decision. Leave unknown destination status unresolved. Keep inspection read-only across connected tools. Confirm that invalidated workers, jobs, and approvals stay invalid. Verify the fleet limit and the reach of the independent stop before enabling writes.

Return authority in stages

Restore the smallest required write scope for a defined set of jobs or resources. Confirm completed writes through destination records before adding workers, permissions, or scope. Hold broader release if authorization, work ownership, or execution records disagree. Document who approved the release and what would require a return to the restricted mode.

NIST guidance places recovery planning, testing, and validation within continuing risk management. Measure service recovery and readiness to execute separately. An application can become available before its automated writes can safely resume. [13, 14, 15]

Isolated validation exercise

Use a disposable environment with synthetic objects, a controlled queue, and two mock destinations. Permit only a fixed benign operation such as writing a marker to a test record. Use 30 workers to represent simultaneous resumption, with no production identities, service connections, or public network access. Keep test evidence and the stop control under a separate operator identity. This proposed exercise evaluates the workflow's ability to enforce authority and record effects.

Baseline and recovery conditions

First confirm that a valid, current approval permits exactly one marker on the intended synthetic object. Confirm that the destination records the worker, authorization, target, and result. A system that rejects all work cannot demonstrate safe operation.

Save a test checkpoint with ordinary unfinished jobs and use visible, labeled records to represent historical decisions. Use the following conditions separately before combining them. Preserve the expected result outside the restored state so the evaluator does not inherit the same stale view as the workers.

Test condition	Expected outcome
A job was canceled after the checkpoint	No worker can commit it after restore.
The destination applied a marker before interruption	Reconciliation finds the original effect. A replay creates no second marker.
Two destinations have the same displayed name	Approval for one synthetic object cannot authorize the other.
An earlier and a current worker are both available	Only the current owner of approved work can commit a marker.
The authorization service becomes unavailable	Protected writes remain suspended. Independent logging and operator stop remain usable.
Several workers resume concurrently	Aggregate changes stay within the approved fleet limit.

For each condition, compare the historical record, current approval, and destination state. Run the same conditions with deterministic job runners if possible. This helps isolate ordinary orchestration behavior from additional variance introduced by model interpretation. A result in this exercise applies to the identity, workflow, tools, and recovery policy actually tested.

Recovery acceptance and measurement

Record attempted operations and effects independently. An emitted tool request establishes an attempt. An authorization decision establishes that a policy accepted or rejected the request. A destination result establishes what the resource actually committed. These observations should be linked through a durable operation identifier that can be reconciled after the workflow restarts.

Measure	Proposed acceptance condition
Unauthorized or out-of-scope effects	Zero committed changes across all test cases.
Duplicate effects	At most one destination change per approved intent.
Stale work after cancellation	No newly committed effect under expired or withdrawn authority.
Operator stop latency	Time from effective stop at the independent control to confirmed enforcement at every test destination stays within the locally approved bound. Record already committed effects separately.
Evidence coverage	Every attempted protected write has a reconciliation status. Every committed change has an independently verifiable receipt.
Authorized work completion	Current, in-scope work succeeds within the recovery objective after the release gate is opened.

The proposed thresholds define a release decision for this exercise. They do not estimate incident probability. Track blocked authorized work as well as blocked unauthorized work. Review changes in reachability, worker identities, tool versions, and failover behavior before generalizing one successful test to another environment.

Assign ownership of the release gate before an incident. Identity engineering should verify current grants and revocation. Platform engineering should verify artifact integrity, job ownership, and enforcement coverage. The resource owner should validate committed effects independently. The incident lead should be able to hold or roll back the return to automated writes using the recoverable operator path.

At initial access, a workflow must be able to prove who approved the action that opens a system. During recovery, it must be able to prove that the same authority still applies to the action it will perform next. Availability metrics and agent summaries answer other questions. The release decision needs evidence from the systems that granted permission and observed the resulting change.

Implementation priorities

Start with one workflow that can change identity, network policy, or other protected state. Inventory the routes by which its actions reach a destination. Set the scope of the first exercise by resource and action, then assign someone who can decide whether automated writes may resume. Use the matrix to coordinate responsibilities.

Owner	First deliverable	Evidence to retain
Service and resource owners	A list of protected operations, destination identities, and allowed scopes.	One authoritative resource identifier per approved target.
Identity and platform engineering	A current authorization check, constrained delegation, and a release control independent of the agent.	Policy decisions, expiry and revocation tests, and a route inventory.
Incident response	A procedure for suspending writes, preserving evidence, and reconciling an unknown destination result.	A trace from the stop decision through confirmed cessation at the destination.
Recovery and assurance	A baseline and isolated restore exercise covering healthy and degraded operation.	Results for authorized completion, stale work, duplicate effects, and fleet limits.

Before expanding coverage

Close any gap that allows a protected write without current authority or produces a destination change that cannot be reconciled. Confirm that authorized work still completes. Estimate the operator effort required to review uncertain outcomes, since a release policy that cannot be followed at the expected workload is difficult to sustain.

Repeat the exercise after changes to identity, orchestration, connector scope, tool versions, or recovery design. Expand permissions and concurrency in increments that keep the validated stop and audit controls effective. Track the date, scope, and assumptions of the last demonstration so a healthy dashboard does not stand in for current evidence.

References

[1] Google Cloud Threat Horizons Report H1 2026. Google Cloud and Mandiant. Case sample and identity trends.

[2] Criminals Use Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Financial Fraud. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center. December 3, 2024.

[3] Designing AI agents to resist prompt injection. OpenAI. Agent manipulation and architectural safeguards.

[4] Incident Report on unsanctioned agent behaviour during cyber testing. UK AI Security Institute. Evaluation incident disclosure.

[5] The Hugging Face incident and the road ahead. OpenAI. August 26, 2026.

[6] Independent investigation of agent behavior in the OpenAI and Hugging Face incident. METR and Redwood Research. August 26, 2026.

[7] AgentCorruption research on persistent agent memory. Zenity Labs. October 8, 2026.

[8] Memory poisoning and write validation in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore. AWS Security Blog. November 9, 2026.

[9] Trained to betray. Microsoft Security Research and Microsoft AI Red Team. November 12, 2026.

[10] Disaster recovery. etcd maintainers. Version 3.6 documentation.

[11] Compensating Transaction pattern. Microsoft Azure Architecture Center.

[12] Design Tenets for Agent Identity Management Systems. NIST. Proposed design tenets.

[13] Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery. NIST SP 800-184. December 2016.

[14] Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management. NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3. April 2025.

[15] Data Integrity Recovering from Ransomware and Other Destructive Events. NIST SP 1800-11. September 2020.